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Abstract Like many other countries, the Netherlands has
a health insurance system that combines mandatory basic
insurance with voluntary supplementary insurance. Both
types of insurance are founded on different principles.
Since basic and supplementary insurance are sold by the
same health insurers, both markets may interact. This paper
examines to what extent basic and supplementary insur-
ance are linked to each other and whether these links
generate spillover effects of supplementary on basic
insurance. Our analysis is based on an investigation into
supplementary health insurance contracts, underwriting
procedures and annual surveys among 1,700–2,100
respondents over the period 2006–2009. We find that
health insurers increasingly use a variety of strategies to
enforce a joint purchase of basic and supplementary health
insurance. Despite incentives for health insurers to use
supplementary insurance as a tool for risk selection in basic
insurance, we find limited evidence of supplementary
insurance being used this way. Only a minority of health
insurers uses health questionnaires when people apply for
supplementary coverage. Nevertheless, we find that an
increasing proportion of high-risk individuals believe that
insurers would not be willing to offer them another sup-
plementary insurance contract. We discuss several strate-
gies to prevent or to counteract the observed negative
spillover effects of supplementary insurance.
Keywords Supplementary insurance  Risk selection 
Switching behavior  Guaranteed renewability
JEL classification D12  G22  I11  I18
Introduction
Many OECD countries, including the Netherlands, com-
bine mandatory basic health insurance with voluntary
supplementary health insurance. Policymakers in these
countries typically consider voluntary (supplementary)
health insurance as one of the primary instruments to limit
statutory financing of health care [1]. Consequently, the
role of supplementary insurance in health care financing is
gradually expanding.
Basic and supplementary health insurance are often
founded on different principles. In the Netherlands, the
mandatory basic health insurance scheme is based on
principles of solidarity,1 universal access, consumer choice
and regulated (or managed) competition. Supplementary
health insurance, in contrast, is exclusively voluntary and
based on the principles of a free insurance market in which
insurers are free to set the terms of the insurance contract
and are allowed to use medical underwriting. Since in the
Netherlands as well as in other countries (e.g. Belgium,
Switzerland) both types of insurance are offered by the
same health insurers, the principles of supplementary
health insurance market may interfere with the principles
of basic health insurance. Specifically, supplementary
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insurance may result in less favorable contracts and
reduced choice for high-risk individuals in basic insurance.
In this paper, the theoretical and empirical effects of
supplementary health insurance on basic health insurance
are examined within the context of the Dutch health
insurance system. Section ‘‘Health insurance in the Neth-
erlands’’ briefly describes the main features of the Dutch
health insurance system and the role of EU legislation.
Next, we identify potential links between basic and sup-
plementary health insurance and we discuss how these
links may affect consumer choice in the market for basic
health insurance. Section ‘‘Methods and data’’ describes
the methods and data used to analyze the links between
basic and supplementary health insurance and the spillover
effects of supplementary on basic health insurance. The
results of this analysis are set out in Sect. ‘‘Results’’. In the
concluding section, we discuss which policy strategies
might be effective to counteract negative spillover effects.
Health insurance in the Netherlands
Since the introduction of the Health Insurance Act (HIA) in
2006, all Dutch citizens are obliged to buy standardized
individual basic health insurance from a private insurer. The
Health Insurance Act replaced the former public health
insurance scheme (available for two-thirds of the population)
and the former voluntary private scheme (for the one-third of
the population with higher incomes). The standardized basic
benefits package covered by the HIA is rather comprehen-
sive and includes e.g. hospital care, GP services, prescription
drugs and maternity care.2 There is a limited annual
deductible of 165 euro per adult individual (in 2010).
The Health Insurance Act was preceded by a series of
market-oriented reforms that were gradually implemented
since the early 1990s. As the design of the insurance sys-
tem has to be in accordance with EU legislation, the
restrictions posed by the EC Treaty had to be considered.
The EC Treaty (article 49) stipulates that restrictions on the
freedom to provide services (insurance) across borders
within the EU shall be prohibited. The Third Non-life
Insurance Directive supplements this provision and intends
to encourage and enhance competition in insurance mar-
kets by requiring the EU Member States to abolish controls
on premium prices and prior notification of policy condi-
tions. Private health insurance falls within the scope of this
Insurance Directive [19]. This would imply that the gov-
ernment is not allowed to regulate prices and contractual
conditions of private health insurance policies. However,
the Insurance Directive provides an important exemption to
this rule. According to article 54 of the Directive, the
introduction of legal restrictions can be justified by reason
of general good, in case private health insurance schemes
‘wholly or partially’ replace the social security system. The
Dutch government considers the basic benefits package as
an alternative to the health coverage provided by a social
security system and therefore deems interventions in basic
health insurance justified [10].3
The aim of the Health Insurance Act is to combine free
consumer choice and incentives for efficiency with uni-
versal access to comprehensive basic health insurance
coverage [39]. Universal access is guaranteed by requiring
health insurers to offer all applicants standardized coverage
at a community-rated premium, while lower-income
groups get income-related tax subsidies to pay this pre-
mium. Since community-rated premiums involve cross-
subsidization from low-risk to high-risk individuals,
insurers would incur predictable profits and losses for
identifiable subgroups of consumers. In order to prevent
risk selection and an unfair level playing field for health
insurers, a risk equalization fund was established. In
addition to a community-rated premium charged by the
health insurer, all individuals pay an income-related con-
tribution to this risk equalization fund. The risk equaliza-
tion fund provides risk-adjusted capitation payments (or
premium subsidies) to health insurers in order to equalize
predictable differences in health care expenditure associ-
ated with individual risk characteristics. On average, risk-
adjusted capitation payments account for half of the total
health expenditure covered by the basic insurance scheme.
Efficiency, the second aim of the HIA, is stimulated by
providing consumers with a free choice of health insurer
(through an open enrollment or guaranteed issue require-
ment) and by providing insurers and health care providers
with increasing room to negotiate about price and quality
of health services. Health insurers are allowed to selec-
tively contract or vertically integrate with health care
providers and may channel enrollees to preferred providers.
In addition to basic health insurance, people are free to
buy supplementary health insurance, which provides cov-
erage for benefits that are not included in the basic benefits
package. Supplementary health insurance provides cover-
age for primarily dental care, physiotherapy and cosmetic
surgery and accounts for about 10% of health care
expenditure (see Table 1 for key figures). About 90% of
2 Long-term care services are covered by a separate mandatory social
insurance scheme (abbreviated as AWBZ).
3 Although the European Commission (EC) has suggested that
private health insurance schemes could be in line with article 54, the
EC has also made clear that interventions are only justified if the
Court considers the measures objectively necessary and proportionate
to the general good [19]. The necessity and/or proportionality of
Dutch governmental interventions is disputed (e.g. [37]). It goes
beyond the scope of this paper, however, to deal with this issue
extensively.
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the Dutch population purchases supplementary health
insurance.
Historically, supplementary health insurance functioned
as a minor extension to the former public health insurance
scheme (covering only few additional benefits) and was
widely perceived as quasi-social insurance. Health insurers
(then sickness funds) charged community-rated premiums
and typically accepted any applicant, irrespective of health
status (except for dental care). As a result, almost all people
bought supplementary insurance as a by-product to basic
health insurance from the same health insurer. The intro-
duction of the HIA, however, implied a much sharper
distinction between basic and supplementary insurance. In
contrast to basic health insurance, the Dutch government
stressed that supplementary health insurance is not based
on the principle of solidarity and therefore it does not
guarantee universal access to the benefits covered by sup-
plementary health insurance [43]. In other words, supple-
mentary health insurance is not intended to replace a social
security system, so the exemption of Article 54 of the Third
Non-life Insurance Directive does not apply. This implies
that the government is not allowed to exert systematic ex
ante control over policy conditions, premium rates and
other provisions [31]. Health insurers are therefore free to
set and differentiate premiums of supplementary insurance
and are allowed to deny or restrict coverage (e.g. by
excluding pre-existing conditions from coverage or by
using waiting periods before coverage becomes effective).
Hence, the dividing line between basic and supplementary
insurance marks the distinction between those entitlements
that, according to the Dutch government, require regulation
to guarantee universal access, and benefits that are left to
the free market for which universal access is not guaran-
teed. Despite the more clear-cut distinction between basic
and supplementary insurance, as effectuated by the HIA,
still almost all people obtain both insurance products from
the same health insurer.
Potential links and spillover effects
Decisions to purchase basic and supplementary insurance
can be linked in several ways. In some countries, health
insurers are legally required to offer basic and supple-
mentary insurance as a joint product [20]. In absence of
such a strong regulatory link, health insurers may be able to
enforce joint purchase by means of tie-in sale provisions in
supplementary health insurance policies. Even without
such tying provisions, consumers may display a strong
preference for joint purchase of basic and supplementary
health insurance because one-stop shopping lowers search
and transaction costs and may facilitate the coordination of
complementary benefits [5, 20]. Finally, joint purchase
may also be the result from custom or habit if supple-
mentary health insurance was traditionally offered as a
minor by-product to basic health insurance (as was the case
in the Netherlands).
If both types of insurance are linked, decisions to pur-
chase supplementary health insurance may influence deci-
sions to purchase basic health insurance. We distinguish
two potentially important negative spillover effects of
supplementary on basic insurance: (1) Supplementary
health insurance may be used as a tool for risk selection in
basic health insurance, undermining the principle solidar-
ity; and (2) Lock-in effects in supplementary health
insurance may reduce freedom of choice for high-risk
individuals in basic health insurance, undermining the
principle of free choice and reducing incentives for effi-
ciency. Evidence of such negative spillover effects of
supplementary insurance on basic health insurance is found
in Switzerland, which has a similarly structured health
insurance system as the Netherlands [5].
Risk selection in basic insurance
In case of perfect risk equalization, risk selection in basic
health insurance would make no sense, since insurers
would not be able to identify risk groups that are
(un)profitable relative to the payments received (i.e. the
community-rated premium plus the risk-adjusted capitation
payment).
Despite the fact that the Dutch risk equalization system
is quite sophisticated, several empirical studies show that
there still are easily identifiable risk groups that are less
attractive than others [36]. In 2005, it was estimated that
health insurers would suffer a predictable loss of 30% on
Table 1 Key figures of supplementary health insurance (SI) in the Netherlands
2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of insurers offering SI 32 33 30 29
Population share having SI (% of total population) 93 92 92 91
Health expenditure covered by SI:
In Euros (billions) 3.4 3.6 3.6 n.a.
As % of total health expenditure 11 12 11 n.a.
Sources: NZa [17], Vektis [41, 42]
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the 10% insured that had made the highest health care costs
in the previous year(s) [21]. Also in 2006, 2007 and 2008,
insurers could easily identify specific risk groups that were
highly unprofitable relative to the community-rated pre-
mium [26–29].4 Given the imperfections of the risk
equalization system, several ex-post compensation pay-
ments were introduced to cover a part (on average about
50%) of the predictable losses. Still, health insurers are
facing substantial incentives for risk selection in basic
insurance. Moreover, the introduction of the new Health
Insurance Act induced strong price competition among
health insurers, resulting in an overall loss of on average
1.5% of total premium revenues of basic insurance in the
period 2006–2008 [6–9]. The continuing strong price
competition puts pressure on insurers to cut costs and thus
reinforces the incentives for risk selection.
Supplementary health insurance can be used as a tool for
risk selection in basic health insurance in two ways [38].
First, insurers can refuse applicants for supplementary
health insurance who are expected to generate losses in
basic insurance. Health insurers can identify unprofitable
applicants by requiring them to fill out a health question-
naire. People who are rejected for supplementary health
insurance will most likely choose another insurer for basic
health insurance as well, particularly if both types of
insurance are strongly linked [38]. As shown in Table 2,
unprofitable high-risk applicants can easily be identified by
health questionnaires asking questions about health status,
specific conditions and prior drug or health care utilization.
Second, supplementary health insurance may also be
used for self-selection. Health insurers may try to attract
favorable risk groups and discourage unfavorable risk
groups to apply for supplementary health insurance pack-
ages. Favorable risk groups can be attracted by a specific
design of supplementary health insurance packages (i.e.
product differentiation), by discounts on supplementary
premiums (i.e. premium differentiation) or by specific
benefits.5 Unfavorable risk groups may be discouraged
from buying supplementary health insurance by not cov-
ering benefits that are attractive to them.
In sum, there is a considerable risk that supplementary
health insurance might be used for risk selection in basic
health insurance and thereby will undermine the principle
of solidarity fundamental to basic health insurance.
Lock-in effect for high-risk individuals
A second spillover effect may result from high-risk indi-
viduals being locked in their current supplementary health
insurance contract. If supplementary and basic insurance
are strongly linked, such a lock-in situation may effectively
reduce free choice of basic health insurance for high-risk
individuals. This would reduce incentives for health
insurers to provide high-quality services and contract high-
quality care for high-risk individuals.
A lock-in situation for high-risk individuals may occur if
the premium they pay for their current supplementary
insurance contract is below the actuarial fair price, while
when they apply for another contract they have to pay a
premium as high as the actuarial fair price.6 In that case,
high-risk individuals may not be able to switch to another,
more attractive supplementary contract. Since the supple-
mentary health insurance market is a free market, health
insurers are likely to either adjust the premium to an
applicant’s risk profile or adjust the applicant’s risk to the
premium by restricting or denying coverage (e.g. pre-
existing condition clauses).7
Traditionally, as explained in Sect. ‘‘Health insurance in
the Netherlands’’, Dutch health insurers made little use of
risk-adjusted premiums for supplementary health insur-
ance. Health insurers could compensate the predictable
losses on the contracts of the high-risk individuals with the
predictable profits on the contracts of the low-risk indi-
viduals [35]. Since the enactment of the HIA, however,
price competition has increased and the profit margins on
the supplementary health insurance have decreased [40,
41]. Therefore, health insurers may have become more
inclined to calculate risk-rated premiums and to use med-
ical underwriting to prevent high-risk applicants from
enrolling. As a consequence, high-risk individuals may be
forced to stick with their current supplementary contracts,
since no better alternatives will be available. In the Neth-
erlands, all health insurers voluntarily included a guaran-
teed renewability (GR) clause in their supplementary
insurance contracts. Generally, these GR provisions stipu-
late that the insurer has to renew the contract at the end of
the contract period at the same conditions that apply for
other subscribers with the same contract. This implies that
no insured’s future premium for a given policy will
increase more than any other insured’s premium increases
4 Imperfect risk equalization implies that some risk groups generate
predictable losses while others generate predicable gains. However,
since the distribution of individual health care expenditures is highly
skewed the individual predictable losses are relatively high and
concentrated in a relatively small group of high-risk individuals.
5 For instance, Dormont et al. [5] discuss the case of a Swiss health
insurer that offers a 3 years’ supplementary insurance contract with
discounts on sun glasses, ski helmets and hospitalizations to people
without any health care consumption during the preceding year.
6 An actuarial fair price is the individual premium required to break
even, given the individual’s expected cost.
7 In practice, health insurers typically employ both strategies to
match premiums and risks, since these strategies are no perfect
substitutes. Complete risk rating is often technically infeasible, too
costly and unattractive because of the damaging effect of such
behaviour on an insurer’s reputation [18]. Large premium variation is
therefore not often seen in practice [11].
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[12]. Thus, people who become a high-risk will pay the
same premium as those who remain low-risk. Hence, each
supplementary insurance contract involves some cross-
subsidization from low-risk to high-risk individuals.8 GR
provisions are not required by law, so the fact that all
contracts include such a GR provision seems to reflect
consumers’ preference for buying insurance that also offers
protection against the risk of becoming a high risk in the
future. In practice, however, the prevailing GR contracts do
not effectively offer a long-term protection against future
contingencies.9 This is because low-risk individuals have
an incentive to leave the contract if the level of cross-
subsidization and the (uniform) premium of the contract
increase over time as a result of an increasing average risk
of the other policyholders. Competing insurers, in turn,
have an incentive to close off old contracts to new entrants
and then selectively accept the low-risks on a new contract.
If low-risk individuals switch to a new contract, the risk
profile of the old contract will worsen and in the end the
contract will be bought only by high-risk individuals pay-
ing a high, but actuarial fair premium. Such ‘‘re-under-
writing’’ practices are observed in the US individual health
insurance market [12] and also seem to occur in the Dutch
supplementary insurance market. For instance, in 2008 two
Dutch health insurers (with a total market share of about
13%) substantially reduced the coverage of their most
extensive supplementary policy, while, at the same time,
introducing a new policy with the same coverage as the
originally most extended supplementary benefits pack-
age.10 Both health insurers used medical underwriting to
prevent high-risk individuals from buying the new gener-
ous policy. When health insurers offer new contracts only
to low-risk applicants or only at risk-rated premiums, high-
risk individuals cannot escape this premium spiral, since all
other contracts will make them worse off than their current
contract. If this is the case, high-risk individuals will be
locked in their current contract.
Therefore, a crucial question is whether health insurers
apply risk rating or selective underwriting policies in
supplementary health insurance. However, as argued by
Dormont et al. [5], even if health insurers do not practice
risk rating or selective underwriting, lock-in effects may
Table 2 Identification of subgroups with predictable losses after risk equalization
Type of question Subgroup % of adult
population
(n = 16.891)a
Predictable
annual
loss (euro’s,
2007)b
Health problems Self-reported health status: poor/fair 21.2 541
Hearing difficulties 4.8 308
Loss of sight 7.3 222
Moving difficulties 14.9 653
Worst score SF-36 on mental health 10.0 297
Specific disorders Arthritis 16.3 401
Asthma/COPD 8.1 460
Hypertension 15.2 342
Rheumatoid arthritis 6.1 725
Urinary incontinence 7.7 500
Three or more self-reported disorders 25.2 463
Prior utilization Medical prescription (within the last 14 days) 48.2 220
Contact with medical specialist (within the past 12 months) 39.8 317
Use of home health care 2.2 1,152
Source: Stam and Van de Ven [29]
a Based on surveys among adult enrollees of a major health insurer (Agis) in 2001
b Based on the risk equalization system of 2007, before ex-post compensations (by which predictable losses are reduced by about 50%). For all
estimated losses: p-value \ 0.05 (Null hypothesis: predictable annual loss equal to zero)
8 In theory, as argued by Herring and Pauly [12], no cross-
subsidization have to take place if premiums of GR contracts are
sufficiently ‘‘front loaded’’ in the current contract period in order to
cover the risk of becoming a high-risk in later contract periods.
Supplementary insurance premiums in the Netherlands, however,
strongly diverge from the incentive-compatible front-loaded premium
schedule as estimated by Herring and Pauly. Rather than charging
front-loaded premiums, Dutch health insurers typically adjust the
uniform (community-rated) premium of a supplementary policy to the
changing risk profile of the remaining pool of policyholders.
9 GR contracts would only offer such protection if premiums would
be sufficiently front-loaded, which is not the case in the Netherlands.
10 One health insurer reported that these changes were induced by the
overly extensive use of benefits covered by its most generous policy.
Spillover effects of supplementary on basic health insurance: evidence from the Netherlands 55
123
occur if high-risk individuals believe that insurers behave
this way. Hence, we did not only examine actual health
insurers’ underwriting behavior, but also consumer beliefs
about this behavior and their anticipation to the expected
insurer behavior.
Methods and data
We employed two methods to investigate the links between
supplementary and basic insurance and the presence of
spillover effects. First, we investigated the contractual
conditions and application forms of all supplementary
health insurance policies that were issued in the period
2006–2009. To establish the links between basic and sup-
plementary insurance, we analyzed for each contract the
presence and nature of tying conditions. To examine
insurers’ underwriting behavior, we determined the use of
premium surcharges, coverage restrictions and the use and
content of health questionnaires for applicants of supple-
mentary insurance. Furthermore, to determine whether
supplementary health insurance is used for self-selection,
we examined whether the supplementary contracts were
designed to attract specific (favorable) risk groups. Second,
over the same period (2006–2009), we used an annual
survey among about 1,700–2,100 respondents to investi-
gate reasons for (not) switching to another health insurer
for basic and/or supplementary insurance and to find out
whether or not consumers faced obstacles or restrictions
when applying for supplementary health insurance.
Data on insurance contracts and application forms were
gathered annually over the period 2006–2009.
Most information was publicly available via the internet,
both on the websites of individual health insurers and on
consumer comparison websites for insurance products (e.g.
www.independer.nl). In case of missing information, insur-
ers’ customer services and insurers’ agents were contacted.
Survey data were obtained from a questionnaire we con-
structed, which was sent in February each year (from 2006 to
2009) to participants of a regularly held internet-based
telepanel. The panel consists of some 2000 respondents,
aged 18 years and older, who are representative of the adult
Dutch population. The panel is managed and maintained by
CentERdata, a research institute specialized in online survey
research. Of each respondent, standard background variables
are routinely collected, such as age, sex, number of house-
hold members, education, primary occupation and income.
Results
We first discuss our findings about the type and strength of
the links between basic and supplementary insurance.
Next, we discuss whether these links have resulted in
negative spillover effects.
Links between basic and supplementary insurance
In the Netherlands, regulation does not require insurers to
link basic and supplementary health insurance. On the
contrary, the new Health Insurance Act even includes a
provision (article 120) to prevent a previously common
tying arrangement. Prior to 2006, most Dutch supplemen-
tary health insurance contracts had a clause that the con-
tract would be automatically terminated once the insured
would switch to another basic health insurance provider
[20]. Under the HIA (article 120), such termination clauses
are explicitly forbidden. However, there appears to be a
discrepancy between rules and practice: when consulting
insurers’ customer services we were told in 2009 by about
half of the health insurers (accounting for about 30% of the
market) that the supplementary insurance would be auto-
matically terminated by the insurer if the customer would
switch to another insurer for basic insurance. Although it is
unclear whether customer services deliberately provide
incorrect information or were just insufficiently trained, it
is likely to reduce the effectiveness of prohibiting termi-
nation clauses.
However, we find that even if the article 120 would be
effective, health insurers can, and increasingly do use a
variety of ways to sell basic and supplementary insurance
as a joint product (see Table 3). As shown in Table 3, in
2009 one out of four health insurers (with a joint market
share of about 10%) offer supplementary health insurance
only in combination with basic health insurance. In addi-
tion, about one-third of the insurers (with a joint market
share of about 40%) requires premium surcharges if
applicants only apply for supplementary health insurance
(buying basic insurance from another insurer) and about
17% requires such surcharges if an subscriber switches to
another provider of basic insurance (which is not prohib-
ited under the article 120 of the Health Insurance Act).
Although these insurers typically claim that the surcharges
are needed to cover extra administrative costs, the level of
surcharges, varying from 25 to 100%, is likely to be much
higher than these additional expenses. About 1 out of 10
health insurers uses more stringent underwriting practices
for people who only apply for supplementary insurance.
Finally, in 2009 almost all health insurers use parent–child
tie-in provisions, which stipulate that children are entitled
to free supplementary health insurance if both parents and
children obtain basic and supplementary health insurance
from the same company.
As shown in Table 3, since 2006, the number of health
insurers using some form of tying arrangement has sub-
stantially increased. By 2009, almost all health insurers use
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at least one of the prevailing tie-in provisions included in
Table 3. In sum, insurers have made it highly unattractive,
if not impossible, to apply for supplementary health
insurance without applying for basic health insurance as
well.11
Spillover effects of supplementary on basic insurance
Have these strong links resulted in the hypothesized neg-
ative spillover effects? We first discuss evidence of sup-
plementary health insurance being used as a selection
device in basic health insurance (the first spillover effect).
Then, we discuss whether high-risk individuals with sup-
plementary insurance face a lock-in problem, which may
reduce their choice of basic insurance (the second spillover
effect).
Is supplementary health insurance used as tool
for risk selection?
An effective way to identify unfavorable risk groups is the
use of health questionnaires when people apply for sup-
plementary health insurance.12 Prior to 2006, about 45% of
the health insurers (then: sickness funds) made use of
health questionnaires [2]. As shown in Table 4, this per-
centage dropped to only about 20% after the introduction
of the new Health Insurance Act and even further to 12% in
2007. In 2008, the number of insurers using health ques-
tionnaires increased to 27%, but then again decreased to
about 20% in 2009 (however, relative to 2008, the average
number of questions increased).
Health questionnaires were only required for the most
comprehensive supplementary insurance policies or for
applicants that only apply for supplementary health insur-
ance. Hence, most health insurers do not acquire infor-
mation about health status of applicants for supplementary
insurance, and therefore cannot use selective underwriting
as a tool for risk selection in basic health insurance.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the minority of health insurers
using health questionnaires actually uses the questionnaires
to identify individuals that may generate predictable losses
in basic insurance. This is because the questions included
in these questionnaires typically relate to benefits covered
by supplementary insurance and not to disorders for which
the risk equalization scheme provides insufficient
compensation.
At first sight, the reduction in the use of health ques-
tionnaires by health insurers since the introduction of the
Health Insurance Act seems surprising because the fierce
price competition among health insurers provides much
stronger incentives for risk selection than prior to 2006.
A first explanation for this seemingly contradictory
behavior is that in 2006, under pressure from the Dutch
Parliament, health insurers collectively and publicly agreed
not to refuse applicants for supplementary health insurance
(except for extensive dental coverage), in order to
accommodate a smooth implementation of the new basic
health insurance scheme. Again under public pressure,
insurers extended this agreement to 2007 [44]. In 2008,
Table 3 Nature and prevalence of links between basic and supplementary health insurance (SI) in the Netherlands between 2006 and 2009
2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of insurers 32 33 30 29
% of
insurers
Market
sharea
% of
insurers
Market
sharea
% of
insurers
Market
sharea
% of
insurers
Market
sharea
SI only in combination with basic health insurance 28 11 12 8 27 11 24 11
Premium surcharges when only applying for SI 19 21 24 34 30 36 34 40
SI premium surcharges when switching to other basic health insurance 6 4 15 17 17 17 17 14
More stringent acceptation policies when only applying for SI n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 13 10 14 10
Parent–child tie-in provisions 19 10 18 10 67 49 86 96
At least one of the above mentioned tie-in provisions [44b [30b [48b [45b 94 89 97 100
a Approximate market shares of health insurers are based on data provided by NZa [13, 15, 16] and annual reports of several health insurers
b Cumulative figures for 2006 and 2007 are minimum levels since information about insurers using more stringent acceptation policies when
people only apply for supplementary insurance was not collected in these years
11 Both the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) [15] and members of
Parliament [32] proposed to intervene in the supplementary insurance
market to prohibit various tying arrangements. The government
stipulated, however, that the proposed interventions were not feasible
because of EU regulations (see Sect. ‘‘Health insurance in the
Netherlands’’).
12 We did not take into account specific questions about dental
health, which are used by most health insurers when people apply for
extensive dental coverage. Since these questions are commonly used
and are not related to specific unprofitable risk groups in basic
insurance, it is unlikely that they are used for risk selection in basic
health insurance.
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however, the agreement was no longer continued, which
may explain the subsequent increase in the number of
health insurers using these health questionnaires. Never-
theless, the use of health questionnaires is still way below
the level prior to the reform, and even slightly decreased
again in 2009. This may have to do with a second potential
explanation for the observed insurer behavior. This
explanation is that since the reform health insurers are
more closely watched by the Dutch Health Authority
(NZa), consumer organizations and the press, and conse-
quently insurers are much more exposed to bad reputation
effects of unpopular behavior such as risk selection. For
instance, since 2006 both the NZa and the Netherlands
Patients and Consumers Federation (NPCF) annually
monitor health insurer behavior and disseminate their
findings in publicly available reports [2, 3, 22, 23]. The
NPCF in particular focuses on health insurers’ underwrit-
ing practices in supplementary insurance. Due to the
increased competition, health insurers may have become
more sensitive to damaging reputation effects of bad pub-
licity. For instance, many health insurers now have client
panels to directly involve the opinion of their customers in
decision making.
A third explanation for the limited use of selective
underwriting in supplementary health insurance is that
switching rates are rather low13 and most switchers are
relatively healthy.14 Potential reasons for low switching
rates among high-risk individuals are discussed below. The
low proportion of high-risk individuals applying for sup-
plementary health insurance reduces the usefulness of
medical underwriting as a selection device.
A second way to use supplementary health insurance as
a tool for risk selection in basic insurance is to design
supplementary benefit packages in such a way as to attract
favorable risk groups. We investigated whether insurers
target benefits to risk groups that are expected to be prof-
itable at the prevailing risk-adjusted capitation payments.
We find that an increasing percentage of insurers (with a
total market share increasing from 36% in 2006 to 67% in
2009—see table 5) targeted supplementary benefits at
specific groups (e.g. families, young couples without chil-
dren or people aged 50?). As such these groups are defined
too broad and heterogeneous to be useful for risk selection
in basic health insurance. However, several benefits pack-
ages appear to be designed to attract the relatively healthy
individuals within the group (e.g. prevention or sport
medical advice).
Hence, although there is some evidence of self-selection via
supplementary insurance, the extent seems to be limited so far.
In sum, we find limited evidence of supplementary
health insurance being used as tool for risk selection in
basic insurance, despite substantial incentives for insurers
to do so. Fear of bad reputation and a limited number of
switchers are the most likely explanations for the limited
use of supplementary insurance for risk selection.
Does supplementary health insurance result
in a lock-in of high-risk individuals?
The limited mobility of high-risk individuals might be
related to lock-in effects in the supplementary health
insurance market. There are three potential reasons for
Table 4 Percentage of health insurers requiring health status information
2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of insurers 32 33 30 29
% of
insurers
Market
shareb
% of
insurers
Market
shareb
% of
insurers
Market
shareb
% of
insurers
Market
shareb
Health questionnairesa with questions about: 22 30 12 22 27 30 21 23
Health care utilizationc 22 (2) 12 (3) 27 (6) 21 (8)
Specific conditionsc 6 (2) 3 (1) 16 (11) 14 (15)
General health status 0 0 13 13
Drug utilization 3 3 10 10
a In general, health history questionnaires are only required for the most comprehensive supplementary health insurances or for applicants that
apply for supplementary health insurance, without applying for basic health insurance as well
b Approximate market share health insurers are based on data provided by NZa [13, 15, 16] and annual reports of several health insurers
c Average number of questions in parentheses
13 The overall switching rate dropped after an all-time-high rate of
18% in 2006 (as a result of the introduction of the new Health
Insurance Act) to 4.4% in 2007, 3.6% in 2008 and 3.5% in 2009 [14,
25].
14 Our survey results have shown that switchers report a better health
status than non-switchers. This is a common result in many studies
both in the Netherlands and in other countries (see e.g. [5]).
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limited mobility of high-risk individuals. First, empirical
research (e.g. [4, 5, 24, 30, 33]) has shown that high-risk
individuals, in general, are less likely to switch due to
higher switching costs, potentially as a result of cognitive
or physical impairments. Second, high-risk individuals may
not be able to switch to another, more attractive (priced)
supplementary health insurance contract, due to either
unavailability of good alternatives or selective underwrit-
ing. Third, high-risk individuals may not consider switch-
ing because they expect to be rejected.
As noted above, our survey results have shown that
switchers report a better health status than non-switchers.
This is a common result in many studies both in the
Netherlands and in other countries (see e.g. [5]). We
examined whether the lower switching rates can be
explained by high-risk individuals experiencing difficulties
in switching to another supplementary insurance contract.
In fact, most supplementary health insurance contracts are
quite attractive for high-risk individuals because premiums
are typically community rated and only differentiated by a
few broad age classes. Furthermore, each insurer offers
supplementary health insurance contracts with a wide range
of benefits. Since we find that still only a minority of the
health insurers uses health questionnaires, high-risk indi-
viduals may encounter limited problems in switching to
another contract.
Indeed, as shown in Table 6, the results of our annual
surveys indicate that only a limited number of people (less
than 0.5%) were refused when applying for health insur-
ance. However, this low proportion can be misleading,
since only a limited number of people actually apply for an
(other) supplementary insurance contract. If we relate the
number of refusals to the number of switchers, we find a
substantial increase in 2008 and a subsequent reduction in
2009 (though still halting at a much higher level than in
2007). This finding is consistent with the use of health
questionnaires in 2008 and 2009 (see Table 4). The vast
majority of refused applications are related to supplemen-
tary dental health insurance and comprehensive supple-
mentary insurance contracts.
Although high-risk individuals may be able to switch to
another attractive supplementary insurance contract, they
may still face a lock-in problem if they are not aware of this
opportunity. As pointed out by Dormont et al. [5], holding
supplementary insurance may also act as a barrier to switch if
customers who consider themselves as a bad risk believe that
insurers reject applications on these grounds. When indi-
viduals with poor health do not even try to switch, health
insurers do not have to select risks. In case of Switzerland,
Dormont et al. [5] found support for such behavior, since
holding supplementary insurance had no significant effect on
switching when the enrollee’s self-assessed health was ‘very
good’, but significantly decreased when the enrollee’s self-
assessed health was ‘poor’. Hence, the likelihood of
switching decreases when subjective health status deterio-
rates [5]. For two reasons, however, this evidence is not
conclusive about the role of consumer beliefs. First, people
in poor health may simply have higher subjective switching
cost, which make them more reluctant to switch. Second, the
lower switching rate among people with poor health may
also be the result of health insurers’ underwriting practices.
In our research, we directly tested for the role of con-
sumer beliefs about insurer willingness to offer supple-
mentary insurance by including questions about these
beliefs in our annual surveys. We specifically asked
respondents who did not switch whether the reason for not
switching was because they expected not being accepted by
the insurer because of their age or health status.
As shown in Table 7, for a substantial and increasing
proportion (4–7%—the increase is statistically significant
at the 1% level) of the non-switching respondents (being
the vast majority of the respondents), the belief not being
accepted by health insurers because of age or health status
was a reason for not switching.15 Given the total adult
Dutch population of 12 million people this implies that in
Table 5 Percentage of insurers targeting supplementary benefits at specific groups (product differentiation)
2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of insurers 32 33 30 29
% of insurers Market
sharea
% of insurers Market
sharea
% of insurers Market
sharea
% of insurers Market
sharea
Product differentiationb 22 36 27 52 50 67 62 69
a Approximate market shares of health insurers are based on data provided by NZa [13, 15, 16] and annual reports of several health insurers
b In general, the benefits are targeted at broad and heterogeneous groups
15 In our surveys the proportion of elderly (over 65) among
respondents of 18 years and older is about 25%, which is somewhat
higher than in the general Dutch population (about 20%). The
proportion of respondents reporting fair or poor health is about 17%,
while the proportion of elderly respondents reporting fair or poor
health is 24%. In sum, about 36% of the respondents is over 65 and/or
has a self-assessed health status that is fair or poor. In 2009 about one-
fifth of these respondents (i.e. 7/36) report that one of the reasons for
not switching was that they believed that they would not be accepted
by the insurer because of their age or health status.
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2009 for about 800,000 people the belief not being
accepted because of age or health status was one of the
reasons for not switching, and for about 400,000 people
this was even the most important reason. Hence, a sub-
stantial number of primarily high-risk individuals (the
elderly and those in poor health) believe being locked-in in
their current supplementary health insurance contract,
despite the still quite lenient underwriting practices of most
health insurers.
Given the strong links between supplementary and
basic insurance, the beliefs among many high-risk indi-
viduals about not being able to switch to another sup-
plementary insurance contract is likely to reduce their
choice of basic insurance as well. Thus, for high-risk
individuals the principle of free choice underlying the
basic health insurance scheme is seriously undermined
by the perceived lack of choice in the supplementary
health insurance market.
Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we explained that the presence of supplemen-
tary insurance may have two negative spillover effects on
basic insurance: (1) it can be used as a tool for risk selection
in basic insurance, and (2) it can reduce choice for high-risk
individuals in the market for basic health insurance.
Although health insurers in the Netherlands have strong
incentives and opportunities to use supplementary health
insurance as a tool for risk selection in basic insurance, we
find only limited evidence of supplementary insurance
actually being used this way. One of the reasons for this is
the insurers’ agreement not to select during the first years
of the reform. Furthermore, switching rates are rather low,
especially among high-risk individuals. This reduces the
usefulness of supplementary insurance as a selection
device. Also, health insurers might fear the damaging
effect of such behavior on their reputation.
Nevertheless, we find that many high-risk individuals do
not (consider to) switch because they believe that they will
not be accepted on another supplementary contract. Hence,
high-risk individuals believe they are locked-in in their
current supplementary insurance contract. Moreover, we
find that the proportion of the population facing such a
lock-in has increased over time, from about 4 to 7% of the
adult Dutch population. Since we also find that supple-
mentary and basic insurance are increasingly sold as a joint
product, this lock-in effect also extends to basic insurance.
This implies that the choice for high-risk individuals in
basic insurance market is substantially reduced by the
presence of supplementary insurance, undermining the
principle of free choice of basic health insurance and
reducing incentives for health insurers to offer attractive
basic health insurance contracts for high-risk individuals
Table 7 Impact on switching behavior of consumer beliefs about not being accepted by health insurers because of age or health status
2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of respondents that did not switch 1,059 1,876 1,518 1,599
One of the reasons for not switching was the belief not being accepted
because of age or health status (%)
4.0 3.7 6.3 6.9
Most important reason for not switching was the belief not being accepted
because of age or health status (%)
1.5 1.6 2.8 3.4
Number of respondents that did not switch but seriously considered to do so 409 121 126 74
One of the reasons for not switching was the belief not being accepted because
of age or health status (%)
4.7 5.0 6.4 5.4
Most important reason for not switching was the belief not being accepted
because of age or health status (%)
3.2 2.5 2.9 4.1
Table 6 Refusals, coverage restrictions and/or premium surcharges
2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of respondents 2,118 2,118 1,682 1,733
Refused applications (% of respondents) 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.2
Enrollees faced with coverage restrictions and/or premium surcharges (% of respondents) n.a. 0.7 4.5 2.5
Number of switching respondents 343 102 44 53
Refused applications (% of switching respondents) 1.8 3.8 18.0 7.5
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(e.g. by contracting the best providers or to organize inte-
grated care for specific chronic diseases).
From the empirical evidence we conclude that the sec-
ond spillover effect (reduced choice of basic insurance) is
much stronger than the first spillover effect (risk selection
in basic insurance). As a matter of fact, the presence of a
strong second spillover effect may even counteract the first
spillover effect, since the lack of mobility among high-risk
individuals reduces the usefulness of supplementary
insurance as a tool for risk selection.
Strategies to reduce spillover effects
What could be effective strategies for policymakers to
reduce the lock-in effect for high-risk individuals?
First, the most radical strategy would be to completely
remove the prevailing links between basic and supple-
mentary insurance, for instance by a legal requirement that
both types of insurance have to offered by strictly separated
legal entities. Such a strict separation, however, would
raise consumers’ search costs and would inhibit an effec-
tive coordination of complementary services covered by
basic and supplementary health insurance [20]. A second
strategy would be to limit the role of supplementary health
insurance in health care. A confinement of the role of
supplementary insurance to ‘luxury’ benefits (e.g. cosmetic
surgery, spa treatments, first class hospital services) would
make this type of insurance dispensable also for high-risk
individuals, which would reduce the lock-in effect. Limit-
ing the role of supplementary insurance, however, may
directly conflict with the policymakers’ aim to reduce the
share of public health care expenditure. Given the negative
spillover effects of expanding the role of supplementary
insurance by reducing the basic benefits package, alterna-
tive strategies to contain public expenditures might be
more attractive, such as the introduction of shifted
deductibles for basic insurance, as proposed by Van Kleef
et al. [34]. A third strategy to reduce the lock-in effect for
high-risk individuals would be to monitor insurers’
underwriting practices and to make the results public, as is
in the Netherlands annually done by both the Netherlands
Patients and Consumers Federation (NPCF) and the Dutch
Healthcare Authority (NZa). As our findings indicate, this
strategy could make insurers reluctant to engage in strin-
gent underwriting practices because they want to avoid a
loss of reputation. A fourth strategy would be to improve
consumer information about insurers’ underwriting prac-
tices. Our findings demonstrate that many high-risk indi-
viduals do not (consider to) switch because they believe
that they will not be accepted when applying for another
supplementary insurance contract, despite only a minority
of the health insurers actually seem to do so. To decrease
the substantial discrepancy between consumer beliefs and
actual practice, policymakers could be more active in dis-
seminating information about actual switching opportuni-
ties, particularly to high-risk individuals.
When a combination of the above-mentioned strate-
gies is effective in reducing the lock-in effect, high-risk
individuals will encounter less restrictions to switch to
another basic and supplementary insurance contract. By
removing restrictions of free choice for high-risk indi-
viduals, however, supplementary health insurance may
become a more effective tool for risk selection in basic
insurance.
As long as health insurers face incentives for risk
selection in basic insurance, strategies to reduce the lock-in
effect for high-risk individuals may be counteracted by
increasing use of supplementary insurance as a selection
device. Hence, strategies to reduce the second spillover
effect may reinforce the first spillover effect. This implies
that for any strategy to be successful in the long-run, the
incentives for risk selection in basic health insurance
should be largely eliminated. The most effective way to
accomplish this is by further improving the prevailing
method of risk equalization.
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